

Royal Commission
into the Management of Police Informants

STATEMENT OF ANDREW JOHN GLOW

- 1 My full name is Andrew John Glow.
- 2 I make this statement in response to a request from the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants. This statement is produced to the Royal Commission in response to a Notice to Produce.
- 3 I am currently employed by Victoria Police as an Inspector in the State Emergency Support Command.
- 4 Between February 2008 and January 2011, I was the Inspector in charge of the Source Development Unit (SDU) and the Undercover Unit (UCU). I reported to Superintendent Tony Biggin, who was in charge of the Covert Services Division. Supt Biggin was succeeded by Superintendent Paul Sheridan in 2010 and, thereafter, I reported to Supt Sheridan. I recall that Detective Inspector John O'Connor became a dedicated Inspector in charge of the SDU at some point. I cannot recall when that occurred. I have been informed that it was May 2010. I have no reason to doubt that. From that point, I was the Inspector in charge of the UCU only.
- 5 In preparing this statement, I have been shown documentation that indicates that, in my role as Inspector in charge of the SDU, I knew that there was a human source with registration numbers 2958 and 3838. To the best of my recollection, I did not know the identity of that source at that time. I detail my involvement with human source 2958/3838 below.
- 6 I cannot specifically recall when I learned that Nicola Gobbo had been registered source 2958 and 3838.
- 7 In January 2011, I moved from the SDU to Witness Protection. Sandy White-O
Sandy White-O By the time I commenced the role at Witness Protection, I was aware that Ms Gobbo was Witness F and had provided information and assistance to Victoria Police. I do not recall making the connection at that time that Ms Gobbo was particularly the source referred to as 3838 and 2958, but I now know this is the case.

- 8 In preparing this statement I have had access to my diaries and emails. I have been told that my diaries from 2010 onwards cannot be located so there are some events from that period that I have not been able to cross reference in my diaries.

Educational background and employment history (Q1)

- 9 I graduated from Victoria Police Academy in 1977. Details of my progression through the ranks and my relevant training are contained in Annexure A to this statement.

Involvement or association with any investigation which dealt with Ms Gobbo (Q2)

Surveillance of Ms Gobbo

- 10 In November 2007, I was Inspector in the Technical Support Unit (TSU) – a division of the Covert Support Division of Victoria Police.
- 11 In this capacity, I received an application dated 20 November 2007 to install surveillance devices at Ms Gobbo's home¹. The application indicates that the surveillance related to Operation Gosford, an investigation relating to threats to kill Ms Gobbo. There is a note in my diary on 20 November 2007 that refers to Operation Gosford video surveillance. I do not have any independent recollection of this application.
- 12 I have been shown the application documentation in preparing this statement and I note that Detective Senior Sergeant Gavan Ryan emailed me directly to advise that he approved the application².
- 13 A summary of the basis for the application – death threats, believed to be originating from [REDACTED] and his associates – is contained in an attachment to the email.³ I believe that I would have briefly read the contents at the time.
- 14 From TSU's perspective, the assessment would have been whether we had the equipment and the resources to complete the job. We would have considered the nature of the risk outlined in the application in a general sense to the extent this was required to prioritise the job.
- 15 I note that the application refers to Ms Gobbo by her name and that she had reported these threats to police.

¹ VPL.6066.0020.2315.

² VPL.6066.0020.2313.

³ VPL.6066.0020.2313; VPL.6066.0020.2315

- 16 Although I cannot recall specifically, I expect that I would not have received any additional briefing in relation to the threats beyond the summary contained in the application. The application refers to Ms Gobbo being a high-profile barrister and if I had turned my mind to the reason for the death threats, I would have assumed that they were connected to her work.

Detective Inspector, SDU and UCU

General practices

- 17 In this role, I oversaw the operations of the SDU and the UCU. I was not [REDACTED] [REDACTED] from the [REDACTED] which was [REDACTED]. I understood that the reason [REDACTED] was because it presented greater risks to members than [REDACTED] Victoria Police members [REDACTED] personally involved in [REDACTED] within [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] to conduct welfare checks on members, attend meetings, and receive source progress reports. I believe I did so once or twice a week.
- 18 I understood my role at both the SDU and the UCU as being to manage the policy, procedural and financial administration associated with running the two units, which was where my experience lay. I saw my job as "greasing the wheels" for the members to do their specialist policing work. There were a large number of administrative issues that the UCU and SDU had to deal with – including managing the Imprest accounts for expenses, equipment sign out, property sign out, accounting for [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] and maintaining vehicle log-books. There was also a need to manage a number of [REDACTED] including [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that were held in those [REDACTED].
- 19 My previous experience in managing policy did not extend to policies related to human source management. I also did not have any previous experience in handling human sources. Whilst I was a little uneasy about dealing with an area of policy that I had little training or experience in, I tried to learn the area on the job and make sure the unit members could focus on their work. I was focussed on the safety of human sources and the members handling them.
- 20 Officers White and Black had the day-to-day running of the SDU. They were both [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in the SDU.

- 21 I had been a [Sandy White-O] at [Sandy White-C] Police Station with Officer White and I knew him to be a competent, honourable and honest officer. I thought he was a good operator and a [Sandy White-O] I understood that he had laid the foundations for the unit and to some extent he was the de facto leader of the SDU in my absence.
- 22 I did not previously know Officer Black but I had no reason to believe that he was not honest, diligent or competent. I had confidence in both Officers White and Black. Whilst [REDACTED] I was available by phone if issues arose that needed to be briefed up.
- 23 My memory is that I was spread very thin across the two units. It was a full-time job just keeping on top of the administrative load.
- 24 Day-to-day, my management role did not in general require knowledge about the identity of registered human sources. A cardinal rule of the unit was that human sources were always referred to by their number not their name. Members of the SDU would use registration numbers in discussion, which meant little to me. I did not believe there was a need for me to know the identity of human sources. It was not part of why I was there. I did not think I needed to know to do my job.
- 25 In any case, I did not have the time to get to know the sources behind the numbers. As I have said, my job was trying to grease the wheels of the unit as much as possible to relieve the administrative burden on the members.
- 26 I believe I might have read source profiles while I was in the role. I do not have any recollection now of doing so. I have no recollection of seeing Ms Gobbo's source profile.
- 27 I am sure that if I had needed to know and had asked a member who a particular source was, the members of the unit would have told me. I don't recall ever asking.

Imprest Accounts

- 28 I have been shown a number of "Money from Imprest Accounts" application forms for "2958" that I recommended for payment. I do not specifically recall any of these applications.
- 29 I received many of these forms in relation to sources managed by the SDU. The general process was that a handler would make an application for money from the Imprest Account that would go to their supervisor. The supervisor would review the application and then forward it to me. If I considered that the payment should be made, I would approve the application. The application would then be reviewed by the

Superintendent. I would provide additional explanation in relation to the application if required.

- 30 The Imprest Accounts could be accessed in two ways. Applications could be made for reimbursement of an expense already incurred, or an application could be made in advance for an anticipated expense. Both required receipts to be provided.
- 31 The Imprest Accounts were similar to a petty cash system and was used to manage operational expenses incurred by the unit. Examples of operational expenses might include petrol, accommodation, meals, and mobile phone charges.
- 32 The SDU and the UCU each had separate Imprest Accounts.
- 33 Given the nature of the work undertaken by the SDU, the Imprest Accounts could also from time to time be used for [Sandy White-O] in relation to sources such as paying for [Sandy White-O] I believe this on occasion included minor expenses to do with [Sandy White-O] for a source, such as some money to buy [Sandy White-O]
- 34 I recall that Supt Biggin was particular in checking Imprest Account applications. Supt Biggin and I would meet approximately once a week so I could keep him abreast of relevant issues at the SDU and UCU. One of the items we would look at were Imprest Account applications. Supt Biggin would look at each application individually. They needed to be properly justified and the forms needed to be completed properly.
- 35 The expenses requiring reimbursement from the Imprest Accounts were generally small claims less than \$100, but if a member put a good reason forward to justify (for example) the [Sandy White-O] of a [Sandy White-O] to get [Sandy White-O] that might be considered.
- 36 The Imprest Account applications required auditing and I recall conducting spot audits of diary entries to ensure that Imprest Account applications were supported by the necessary evidence. Although I recall conducting such audits, I believe that day-to-day the responsibility lay with the handler's supervisor to be checking that diaries and receipts supported the claim.
- 37 I have a faint memory of speaking to Officer White about the authorisation of concert tickets for human source 3838 as a welfare payment. My diary records that on 15 August 2008 at 11.30 am I spoke with Superintendent Biggin about a request for "\$1,000 assistance to 3838" but it does not specifically refer to concert tickets. This may have been the concert tickets, but I cannot recall. The Imprest Account application

was approved by Superintendent Biggin subject to conditions. I do not now recall what those conditions were.

- 38 The authorisation of concert tickets was not a common type of expense, but I can understand why the application would have been made to the Imprest Account for the source's welfare. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If you needed to provide [REDACTED] it would be easier to go through the Imprest Account, particularly if a member had already spent money on an expense and was requesting reimbursement.

Dealings with 2958 and 3838

- 39 I am recorded in a Change of Nominated Participants Form dated 9 April 2008 as the new OIC for source 2958, replacing Detective Inspector Rob Hardie. The change is noted as being effective from February 2008 owing to "Departmental Inspector rotations", which is shortly before I commenced in my SDU role.⁴
- 40 I have been shown Officer Black's diary entry dated 14 March 2008, which records that he briefed me in relation to 2958 on this day. My diary also records that I spoke with Officer Black sometime after 4:00 pm that day in relation to an incident which had occurred the previous day. The issue appears to relate to a SDU member speaking to a Purana Taskforce member "re human source ID". My diary notes that Supt Biggin is aware of the situation. My diary notes "issue why not advised earlier".
- 41 I have no recollection of this matter. I expect that this conversation was only ever conducted by reference to the source's registration number and did not involve any discussion about the source's identity.

Request to Audit human source files

- 42 It appears from emails I sent on 13 February 2008 to Officer White, Black and Rob Hardie that Supt Biggin directed me to conduct a "procedural, ethical and value audit" on all the current human sources managed by the SDU in particular "2958". I do not have any recollection now of receiving this instruction and do not know why "2958" was specifically mentioned.

⁴ VPL.0100.0121.0241 at 0264.

- 43 I had never been asked to conduct a "procedural, ethical and value audit" before and do not know, even now, what that meant. The types of audits I had previously conducted were largely procedural, for example, relating to finances, equipment, or processes.
- 44 In preparing to conduct the audit I can see that I emailed Officers White and Black for suggestions on the best way to proceed.⁵ I also emailed the former OIC of the unit, Detective Inspector Rob Hardie.⁶ I had never audited a human source file and had not received any training in how to do so. I do not recall receiving emails in response. I have been informed that no response to my emails have been located.
- 45 I do not now recall whether I conducted this particular audit. I have not been shown any documents that appear to have been created in connection with such an audit. However, if Supt Biggin had asked me to do something, I expect I would have done it.
- 46 I have been shown an entry in the Source Management Log (SML) for 2958 dated 5 May 2008 referring to a review of the management of 2958 by myself and Superintendent Biggin. I am informed this SML was maintained in relation to Ms Gobbo's management as a human source. I have no recollection of undertaking this review. It could be that the reference to "review" relates to the "procedural, ethical and value audit" I was tasked to do by Supt Biggin.
- 47 I recall conducting other, more traditional audits at SDU such as audits of Imprest Account applications. This involved reviewing applications for compliance with policies and the relevant legislation, and that they were supported by source documents, diary notes and receipts.
- 48 I do recall that, on occasion, I conducted audits of human source files to ensure procedural and policy compliance. In auditing these files, there would not have been any documents that would have [Sandy White-O] the [Sandy White-O] except for [Sandy White-O] [Sandy White-O]. The human source files would often be voluminous so I would only look at a sample of documents.

Provision of mobile number for 3838

- 49 I have been shown an email chain dated 13 August 2008, which requests that the mobile telephone numbers for two sources, including "3838" be provided to Graham Ashton.⁷ The email was sent by Graham Ashton as Assistant Director of the OPI to Deputy

⁵ VPL.6066.0019.8504

⁶ VPL.6066.0019.8238

⁷ VPL.2000.0002.0084

Commissioner Simon Overland. AC Overland then forwarded the request to Supt Biggin indicating that he had agreed to the mobile telephone numbers being provided. Supt Biggin then forwarded the email to Officers White and Black to action. I was only "cc'ed" into the email chain in this final email and it did not require any action on my part, especially given the seniority of those involved. I have no independent recollection of this request, or the circumstances for it.

Briars Taskforce

- 50 Between 11 May 2009 and 5 June 2009, I was Acting Staff Officer to Rod Journing who was the Acting Commander, Intelligence and Covert Support Command (I&CS). This role was additional to my duties with SDU and UCU but required me to work at the Victoria Police building at 412 St Kilda Road.
- 51 I was aware of the existence of a number of taskforces that were operational at this time, including Briars and Petra. I did not know much about either Briars or Petra, nor the names of the members involved in the investigations. I have been informed that the Briars Taskforce related to the murder of Mr Chartes-Abbott. I believe I would have known at least this fact at the time.
- 52 My diary records a number of meetings related to issues to do with investigators from the Briars Taskforce wanting access to records relating to a source. I do not recall the discussion being about the source's identity. I expect the discussion might have involved source numbers, but I don't independently recall what they were.
- 53 At 16:10 on 2 June 2009 my diary records a meeting with A/Commander Journing. My diary records that Officer Peter Smith (HSMU) and Officer Black had concerns about the harm to "VicPol, Command and HS". It also records that SDU was to provide materials. I expect that the materials referred to were created by SDU containing information obtained from a source.
- 54 My diary records that on 3 June 2009 I contacted Detective Inspector Steve Waddell from Briars Taskforce and arranged a meeting for 3:00pm that afternoon. Officer Peter Smith (HSMU), Officer Black, Superintendent Porter and Senior Sergeant Ron Iddles attended. My diary records that the matter was to be escalated by Supt Porter to Assistant Commissioner (Crime) Danyne Moloney.
- 55 On 15 June 2009, my diary records that I attended a further meeting with Supt Biggin, Supt Porter, Officer Fox, and Officer Smith. My diary records that the Briars Taskforce

Board of Management "BOM" namely AC (Crime) Moloney and AC Luke Cornelius would determine the issue.

- 56 My recollection is that SDU members were not happy with this outcome. I recall generally that they were concerned about the significant risks that could arise if a human source was transitioned to a witness. I believe that the potential harm to "VicPol" also related to the harm to the source, because it would be a terrible outcome if a source was harmed or killed because of their work as a source.
- 57 Based on reading my own diary entries for this period, I understand that the request by Taskforce Briars represented a significant shift away from the sterile corridor principle. At a general level, I understand that this is a significantly different approach to how intelligence was usually communicated from the SDU to investigators, but I do not recall specifics about these meetings. The purpose of the SDU was to avoid direct contact between investigators and the human source.
- 58 This would breach a policy that was in place to limit the potential harm that could face a source if their identity was disclosed. If a source's identity was disclosed to investigators, the SDU lost control of the anonymity of the source.
- 59 I understood that the guiding principle in relation to the usual approach was that intelligence work and evidentiary work were completely different and the two should be kept separate. I understood that there were similar reasons why you would generally not Sandy White-O with Sandy White-O as a [REDACTED] However, HSMU were involved in these meetings and they were responsible for the relevant policies. Furthermore, the request had come down from the Board of Management, so there were senior members of police involved in the decision-making process.
- 60 My understanding of the risks to Command or Victoria Police referred to by Officer Black relate to concerns about the personal safety of the human source. The concern was that investigators might want to make the source a public witness, which could endanger the human source's life. Any subsequent endangerment to the human source could have reputational damage for Victoria Police.
- 61 I have been shown Officer Black's electronic diary entries dated 1, 2 and 3 June 2009 in which he records concerns about Briars Taskforce wanting to obtain a statement from 3838. I note that Officer Black's entry on 1 June 2009 records that the "OIC unaware of situation and had not been briefed". The reference to "OIC" would be me. My diary

does not record a conversation with Officer Black on 1 June 2009 although I was at the SDU that day.

- 62 Based on reading Officer Black's diary entries, I believe that I would have been aware at the time that the source being discussed was 3838 and 2958. However, I expect the discussion involved references to these numbers, rather than the source's identity.
- 63 Officer Black's diary entries contain a lot of detail about these meetings and the general issue of the source becoming a witness. I do not recall this information now and I do not know what, if any, of this information I knew at the time.
- 64 I did understand the general concepts about intelligence being separate from evidence, as I have set out above. It might have been better for me to understand these issues more thoroughly to be part of these discussions, but the specialist SDU members and very senior Victoria Police members were present and active participants at these meetings.

Witness F point of contact

- 65 I have been shown an email dated 24 September 2010 from DI O'Connor that records that I will be the point of contact for Witness F between 26 September 2010 and 1 October 2010. Attached to the email are the Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) in relation to contact with Witness F at this time.⁸
- 66 As stated above, I have been informed that DI O'Connor took over as Inspector in charge of the SDU in May 2010. From then on, I no longer had day to day management of the SDU.
- 67 I do not doubt that I received this email and request, but I have no recollection of receiving any messages or speaking to Witness F during this week. I do not remember if I was briefed by DI O'Connor before he went on leave.
- 68 Reading the SOPs now, I expect that I might have known that "Witness F" was a lawyer, given what is set out in the SOPs. However, I do not have any recollection of this. Given the mentions of the SDU in these SOPs, it may have been apparent to me that Witness F had been a human source. However, I do not recall knowing this.
- 69 In any event, I do not believe that I connected "Witness F" with 2958 and 3838 at this point in time.

⁸ VPL.0005.0013.1304; VPL.6066.0007.9566.

Witness Protection

70 In January 2011, I moved to Witness Security. I have dealt with this in more detail in answering Question 6 below, [REDACTED]

Use of Ms Gobbo as a Human Source

How I learned, or were given reason to believe, Ms Gobbo was providing information to police (Q3) and awareness of others (Q4)

- 71 I know now that Ms Gobbo was a registered human source. However, I do not have a specific recollection of when I learned that Ms Gobbo had been a registered source and had provided information to Victoria Police.
- 72 At the time that Briars Taskforce requested a statement, and my involvement in the meetings that arose as a result of that request, I expect that I knew that 3838 was a lawyer and that it was a woman. I do not recall knowing that 3838 was Ms Gobbo at this point.
- 73 As set out in response to Question 6, I expect that I became aware that Ms Gobbo had acted as a human source in around 2011, when I had moved to the Witness Security Unit.

Authorisation of the use of Ms Gobbo as a human source (Q5)

- 74 I was not directly involved in the authorisation or continued authorisation of Ms Gobbo as a human source. When I commenced my SDU role, Supt Biggin was the Local Source Registrar. He was responsible for making the decision to register or deregister sources.
- 75 I understood registration and deregistration generally. From time to time there would be discussions about whether or not a source should be deregistered. If for example, a source was no longer providing useful information, then a decision might be made to deregister them. These matters would be escalated to Supt Biggin to determine and we would provide the information he required to make those decisions. It is possible that those discussions might have occurred directly between SDU members and Supt Biggin.
- 76 Whilst in charge of the SDU, I vaguely recall handling one issue posed by 3838. I cannot now recall the specifics of the discussions or who raised the issue, but the concern was that the source often wanted Victoria Police to act immediately on information provided. I recall the concern was that the source might approach other Police Agencies with the information if the SDU didn't pass on information, or act on the information in a timely fashion.

- 77 I recall the handlers being concerned about the possibility that should the source approach another Police Agency with information, her role as an informer for Victoria Police could be exposed. As a result, thought was being given to either imposing stricter guidelines on the relationship between the source and the handlers, or deregistering the source.
- 78 I expect that Supt Biggin was made aware of these concerns, but I do not specifically recall this occurring.

Personal contact with Ms Gobbo (Q6)

- 79 The only contact I have had with Ms Gobbo occurred in 2011 after I joined Witness Security.
- 80 I recall [redacted] between Ms Gobbo and [redacted] in [redacted] with [redacted] Sandy White-O [redacted] I [redacted] Sandy White-O in my capacity as Inspector, Security Services Division, Witness Security, as a [redacted] to the [redacted] between [redacted] and Ms Gobbo.
- 81 I do not remember the specifics of [redacted] but I do recall that [redacted] concerned the [redacted] Sandy White-O of [redacted] Sandy White-O I recall that she did not like the [redacted] that had been [redacted] and wanted [redacted] that could not be [redacted] I expect the date [redacted] would be recorded in my missing diary.
- 82 I expect that this may have been the time when I learned that Ms Gobbo had acted as a human source. I cannot say for sure that I made a positive connection in my mind between Ms Gobbo and the source that had been known as 3838 and 2958. But by this point, I believe I knew that Ms Gobbo was [redacted] Sandy White-O for [redacted] Sandy White-O because [redacted] Sandy White-O and that she had been a lawyer.
- 83 I believe I may have met Ms Gobbo on one other occasion. I have been shown an email chain dated 30 June 2011 regarding a meeting attended by Sergeant Jason Kelly, Sergeant Baulch, [redacted] myself, Ms Gobbo (referred to as Witness F), and a witness in Operation Kennels.⁹
- 84 I do not recall having any awareness of what Operation Kennels related to. I have a vague recollection of this meeting occurring at a hotel. I attended in my capacity as

⁹ VPL.0005.0013.1329.

Inspector, [REDACTED] Like with the SDU and UCU, the role of Inspector at the Witness Security Unit was to manage the unit and policies, rather than be involved in the work of [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] My recollection is that the meeting regarded the possibility of the witness in Operation Kennels [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I do not recall now who that witness was.

- 85 I do not have any further recollection of the discussions that occurred at that meeting. My diary from this period has not been located so I cannot check whether I have made any relevant entries. I am not sure whether as a matter of practice I would have made notes about such a meeting.

Information & assistance received (Q7 & Q8)

- 86 I do not know what information or assistance Ms Gobbo provided to Victoria Police, and I do not expect that I have ever known.

Concerns raised as to the use of a legal practitioner as a human source (Q9)

- 87 I do not recall any concerns being raised with me about a legal practitioner being used as a human source.
- 88 Hypothetically speaking, if I had been told that a human source was a lawyer, I expect my reaction would have been to ask some further questions. I might have asked "Who is the source informing on?", "What information has been obtained?", "Can we use it without it causing us any grief further down the track?" and "Do we have advice about whether this is appropriate or inappropriate?"
- 89 It would clearly be inappropriate for a lawyer to inform on her own clients because of issues to do with legal professional privilege. However, if the source was giving information about other individuals, I do not immediately see an issue. I believe I would not have expected that a lawyer would inform on their own clients.
- 90 If it was made apparent to me that a lawyer was informing on her own clients, I believe I would have sought guidance from Legal Services at Victoria Police about what to do.

Awareness about disclosure in relation to Ms Gobbo (Q11)

- 91 I do not believe I was involved in any discussions around issues of disclosure in relation to Ms Gobbo.

Other human sources with obligations of confidentiality or privilege (Q12)

92 I am not aware of any other human sources with obligations of confidentiality or privilege.

Training (Q13)


93 My recollection of the relevant training I have received on the specific topics is as follows:

- (a) Obligation of disclosure – I don't recall receiving specific training of this topic, however, it was likely covered in basic training in the Academy and the Detective Training School.
- (b) The right of an accused person to silence – this would have been covered in basic training in the Academy.
- (c) Legal professional privilege – I don't recall any specific training on this topic. However, I have gained an understanding of the principle of legal professional privilege in the course of my career as a Police Officer.
- (d) Public interest immunity - I don't recall any specific training on this topic. However, I have gained a working knowledge of public interest immunity in the course of my career as a Police Officer.
- (e) Professional and ethical decision making – I do not recall any specific training on this topic per se, however, ethical conduct in policing is a common thread in training delivered by Victoria Police.

Other information (Q14)

94 I have nothing further to add.

Dated: 21 November 2019


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Andrew John Glow

Annexure A

- 1 A summary of the major roles I have undertaken and my progression through the ranks is as follows:
 - (a) 1976 : Constable, Police Academy;
 - (b) 1977 – 1978: Detective Constable, Russel Street CIB;
 - (c) 1978 – 1981: Detective Senior Constable, Fitzroy;
 - (d) 1981 – 1984: Detective Senior Constable, Russel Street CIB;
 - (e) 1984 – 1986: Detective Senior Constable, Drug Squad;
 - (f) 1986 - 1988: Detective Senior Constable, St Kilda CIB;
 - (g) 1988 – 1989: Sergeant, Transit Police;
 - (h) 1989 – 1997: Detective Sergeant, Prahran CIB, and later, Special Response Squad;
 - (i) 1997 – 1997: Acting Senior Sergeant, Ethical Standards Department;
 - (j) 1997 – 2001: Detective Senior Sergeant, Ethical Standards Department;
 - (k) 2001 - 2001: Senior Sergeant, Protective Security Division;
 - (l) 2002 – 2005: Inspector, Corporate Management Review Division;
 - (m) 2005 – 2005: Inspector, Counter-Terrorism Command;
 - (n) 2005– 2008: Detective Inspector, Surveillance Services Unit;
 - (o) 2008– 2011: Detective Inspector, Source Development Unit and Undercover Unit;
 - (p) 2011– 2012: Detective Inspector, Witness Security Unit;
 - (q) 2012– 2018: Inspector , Licencing Enforcement;
 - (r) 2018 - Present: Inspector, State Emergency and Support Command.
- 2 I have completed the Sandy White-O Human Source Management Course which the HSMU and the SDU ran while I was the officer in charge.
- 3 I also hold a Graduate Certificate, Criminology from the University of Melbourne and a Graduate Diploma, Public Administration from the Charles Sturt University.

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