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**Royal Commission
into the Management of Police Informants**

STATEMENT OF ^{Officer Terrasse}

1. My full name is ^{Officer Terrasse} I am currently a Detective Inspector of Victoria Police. I have held this rank since [REDACTED] 2016.
2. I make this statement in response to a request from the Royal Commission into the Management of Police Informants dated 19 March 2019. This statement is produced to the Royal Commission in response to a Request for Statement.

Educational background and employment history (Q1)

3. I have been a member of Victoria Police for [REDACTED] years.
4. On [REDACTED] 198^{PI}, I joined Victoria Police. I graduated from the Victoria Police Academy (**Academy**) on [REDACTED] 198^{PI}.
5. In my training phase post-graduation from [REDACTED] 198^{PI} until 1988, I was stationed at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] police stations.
6. My first gazetted position as a Constable was at [REDACTED] Police Station in 1988.
7. In 1989 I was seconded to [REDACTED] as a Constable.
8. On [REDACTED] 1990 I transferred to the [REDACTED] Criminal Investigation Branch as a Detective Constable. I was promoted to Detective Senior Constable on [REDACTED] 1991. I remained at the [REDACTED] Criminal Investigation Branch until [REDACTED] 1992.
9. From [REDACTED] 1992 to [REDACTED] 1996, I was a Detective Senior Constable in the [REDACTED]. From time to time I would act as a Detective Acting Sergeant.
10. Between [REDACTED] 1996, I was on secondment to the [REDACTED] Taskforce.
11. From [REDACTED] 1996 to [REDACTED] 1997, I was a member of the [REDACTED] in my substantive rank of Detective Senior Constable. I had further periods of time as a Detective Acting Sergeant until I was promoted on [REDACTED] 1997 to Sergeant at [REDACTED] Police Station.
12. I remained at [REDACTED] Police Station until [REDACTED] 2001 when I transferred as a Detective Sergeant in the [REDACTED].

13. From [REDACTED] 2001 until [REDACTED] 2006, I remained with the [REDACTED] team as a Detective Sergeant. However, I would periodically spend time as a Detective Acting Senior Sergeant as required.
14. Between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 2006, I was seconded to the Office of Assistant Commissioner Crime (Simon Overland) as a Detective Acting Senior Sergeant. I spent [REDACTED] as a Detective Acting Inspector as Staff Officer (to the Assistant Commissioner).
15. Between [REDACTED] 2007 and [REDACTED] 2008, I was seconded to the Office of Deputy Commissioner (Simon Overland) as Staff Officer (to the Deputy Commissioner) in the rank of Detective Acting Inspector.
16. Between [REDACTED] 2008 and [REDACTED] 2009, I was seconded to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as a Detective Acting Senior Sergeant.
17. In [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 2009, I was on secondment to the Office of the Chief Commissioner (Simon Overland) as Staff Officer (to the Chief Commissioner) in the rank of Detective Acting Inspector.
18. Between [REDACTED] 2009 and [REDACTED] 2010, I was seconded to [REDACTED], which had responsibility for the [REDACTED] and preparation of the brief of evidence for the [REDACTED]. I held the rank of Detective Acting Senior Sergeant at this time.
19. In [REDACTED] 2010, I was seconded to the [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] as a Detective Sergeant.
20. In [REDACTED] 2010, I was promoted to Senior Sergeant at [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] where I remained until [REDACTED] 2012.
21. In [REDACTED] 2012, I was seconded to the [REDACTED] for a research/project role with the [REDACTED] for one month.
22. In [REDACTED] 2012, I was seconded to the Source Development Unit (SDU) ICSC as a Detective Senior Sergeant.
23. In [REDACTED] 2013, I transferred to [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

24. From [REDACTED] 2013 to [REDACTED] 2013, and [REDACTED] 2013 to [REDACTED] 2016 I was on secondment as Inspector at the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
25. In [REDACTED] 2013, I transferred to a Detective Senior Sergeant role within the Human Source Management Unit, ICSC where I remained until [REDACTED] 2015. During this time, I spent a total of [REDACTED] upgraded to Detective Acting Inspector, Human Source Management Unit and Dedicated Source Management Team.
26. From [REDACTED] 2014 to [REDACTED] 2015, I was seconded as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Police Stations.
27. Between [REDACTED] 2015 and [REDACTED] 2016, I was seconded to [REDACTED]
as the [REDACTED] as a Detective Acting Inspector.
28. On [REDACTED] 2016 I was promoted to Inspector, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] now
[REDACTED]
29. Between [REDACTED] 2017 and [REDACTED] 2018, I was seconded to [REDACTED] and was part of the team that conducted the [REDACTED]
30. In [REDACTED] 2019, I was seconded to [REDACTED]
31. Since [REDACTED] 2019, I have been [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
32. I hold the following qualifications:
- Certificate IV – Workplace Training and Assessment [REDACTED]
 - Certificate IV – Workplace Training and Assessment [REDACTED] and
 - Graduate Certificate in Applied Management (Policing and Emergency Services [REDACTED])
33. I have completed the following courses:
- Detective Training School [REDACTED]
 - Sub-Officers Course and Brief Checking Course [REDACTED]
 - Investigation Management Course [REDACTED]
 - Discipline Investigation Course [REDACTED]
 - Inspector Qualifying Program [REDACTED] and

f. Inspector Development Program [REDACTED]

34. I have received the following awards:

- a. Investigative Excellence Award – awarded to the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- b. Commission from the Premier of Victoria – For exceptional and dedicated duty during Operation [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- c. Investigative Excellence Award – awarded to the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] investigators in relation to the investigation of the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- d. Highly Commended Certificate [REDACTED]
Investigation – Conspicuous Service Citation “For exceptional performance, dedication and professionalism in sensitively and meticulously undertaking the [REDACTED] from the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] conducted under the auspices of the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
- e. National Medal, [REDACTED] year clasp.

Involvement or association with any investigation which dealt with Ms Gobbo (Q2)

35. In preparing this statement, I have reviewed my hard copy diaries from 2006 onwards and my emails. I have not had access to my entire electronic diary from my period at SDU between [REDACTED] 2012 and [REDACTED] 2013.

36. I view my involvement in investigations that dealt with Ms Gobbo in three phases:

- a. Phase one: As Simon Overland’s Staff Officer at various times from 2006 to 2009;
- b. Phase two: in my role at SDU in 2012; and
- c. Phase three: in my role at HSMU from [REDACTED] 2013 to [REDACTED] 2015.

Phase one: Briars, Petra and Purana Taskforces

37. As stated in answer to question one, for [REDACTED] in 2006, I was Staff Officer to Simon Overland in his role as Assistant Commissioner. Between [REDACTED] 2007 and [REDACTED] 2008, I was Staff Officer to Simon Overland in his role as Deputy Commissioner. In [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 2009, I was again Staff Officer to Simon Overland in his role as Chief Commissioner.
38. In my role as Staff Officer, I was required to attend Management Committee (**Committee**) meetings for Briars, Petra and Purana Taskforces and take minutes.
39. I was not a member of these taskforces or the committees, and my role did not include any decision-making responsibility. My recollection is that a VPS could not be utilised for the taking of minutes due to the complexity of the investigations, including allegations of corrupt police officers and multi-agency involvement.
40. My role in the Committee meetings was to take minutes and I was not a member of the investigative teams or the Management Committees. It was not my role to comment on the strategic direction or management of the investigation. I did not expect to, nor did I, have a full working knowledge of the matters that were being discussed.
41. I have reviewed Committee meeting minutes of Briars, Petra and Purana Taskforces that I authored in my role as Staff Officer to Simon Overland. I am not able to confirm that I have seen all Committee meeting Minutes taken by me and I did not retain copies of the minutes.
42. From the Minutes I have reviewed and my diaries, it would appear that I attended:
- a. Twenty-six Briars Taskforce Committee meetings between [REDACTED] 2007 and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 2007; and [REDACTED] 2009 and [REDACTED] 2009.
 - b. Twenty-one Petra Taskforce Committee meetings between [REDACTED] 2007 and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 2007; and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 2009.
 - c. Nine Purana Taskforce Committee meetings on [REDACTED] 2007, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] 2007, [REDACTED] 2007, [REDACTED] November 2007 and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 2007. My diary isn't clear, but I may also have attended a Purana Taskforce Committee meeting on [REDACTED] 2007.
43. I recall that frequently the Briars, Petra and Purana Taskforce Committee meetings would run consecutively because it was logistically challenging to get the members of the Committees in the same place at the same time.

44. My recollection of these Committee meetings is that they were largely operational, discussing issues such as staffing, resources, and accommodation. They could also be strategic, though. I recall discussion around Office of Police Integrity (OPI) hearings.
45. My impression of these meetings is that it was mostly the investigations managers reporting up to the Committee.
46. I was Staff Officer to Simon Overland until [REDACTED] 2008 and my recollection is that [REDACTED] who was Simon Overland's Staff Officer before and after me, was returning to the role. I assumed that he would have taken over attending meetings at [REDACTED] 2007 or [REDACTED] 2008 as I transitioned to my next role.
47. I am not sure why I attended fewer Purana Taskforce meetings than the others.
48. My recollection is that my [REDACTED] secondment as Staff Officer to Simon Overland in 2009 was to backfill a period of leave of [REDACTED]. During that period, I attended four meetings in relation to Briars Taskforce and four meetings in relation to Petra Taskforce.
49. I recall that at some stage in 2009 Detective Inspector Stephen Waddell raised with me the possibility of secondment to Briars Taskforce as an Investigations Manager however this never transpired. I believe this request was made in consultation with Jeff Pope.

Phase two: SDU

50. After joining SDU in [REDACTED] 2012, one of my first tasks was to review recorded interactions between Ms Gobbo and her human source handlers. I address this in more detail in response to question 3 below.

Phase three: Operations Loricated and Stellified

51. From [REDACTED] 2013 to [REDACTED] 2015 I was a Detective Senior Sergeant at HSMU. I had some limited involvement in what I believe was Operation Loricated and Operation Stellified.
52. On [REDACTED] 2014 I received an email from Inspector Monique Swain in relation to an IBAC enquiry regarding the Petra and Briars Taskforce meetings I attended. I know that there was an enquiry about Loricated but cannot say with certainty that I knew the name of the enquiry at that time or learnt of it later.
53. On [REDACTED] 2014, I meet with Inspector Swain in relation to the IBAC enquiry. I supplied copies of relevant entries in my diaries which included 2007, 2008 and 2009 when I was in the roles of Staff Officer to Simon Overland. Inspector Swain took notes during the meeting and I explained my role in the taking of the minutes at Briars and

Petra Taskforce meetings. I also suggested that Inspector Swain contact [REDACTED] and Inspector Chris Gawn, former Staff Officer to Deputy Commissioner Ken Jones in relation to the enquiry.

54. In 2014, I had a role in over-sighting the dissemination of [REDACTED] in relation to checks conducted by Victoria Police staff on Ms Gobbo's personal details including her address. At that stage, I recall wondering why Ms Gobbo was not in witness protection if there were such serious concerns for her safety. I think I asked someone at the time and was advised that she had refused to enter witness protection.
55. I have been shown an email I sent on [REDACTED] 2014 regarding [REDACTED] searches related to Ms Gobbo. This email would have been sent as part of my role in Operation Stellified.
56. The [REDACTED] process involved HSMU intelligence cell staff, usually [REDACTED] who checked LEAP in relation to [REDACTED]. The results were emailed to me for on sending to the nominated members at Crime Command and Professional Standards Command. HSMU was not responsible for the investigation of the [REDACTED] in relation to Ms Gobbo.
57. I have been shown an email sent to me by Inspector Paul Sheridan on 11 March 2014. It refers to a request for assistance concerning "suspect GOBBO". I have no recollection of this email or what it concerns.
58. On [REDACTED] 2014, in my role at HSMU, I received a phone call from Senior Sergeant Damien Jackson who I later became aware had been doing a review related to Ms Gobbo's dealings with police. Senior Sergeant Jackson called regarding transport of a safe of confidential material from Victoria Police Airlie Leadership and Development Centre, Domain Road, South Yarra to the Victoria Police Complex at 412 St Kilda Road, Melbourne. Senior Sergeant Jackson advised that he would escort the safe the next day between 11.30 a.m. and midday. I was not made aware in detail of the contents of the safe but I later became aware that they generally related to Ms Gobbo. It was my understanding that the safe was being transported to HSMU for secure storage. I am not sure of the Operation name related to Senior Sergeant Jackson's work.
59. I have not had any dealings with any investigations or operations involving Ms Gobbo since I left HSMU in [REDACTED] 2015.

How I learned, or was given reason to believe, Ms Gobbo was providing information (Q3)

60. I recall discussions involving "3838" during the Committee meetings I attended in 2007.
61. To the best of my recollection, it was not until I joined SDU in [REDACTED] 2012 that I learnt that "3838" was Ms Gobbo, and that she had been providing information to police.
62. One of my first tasks after joining SDU was to listen to a number of recordings to try to find the Acknowledgement of Responsibility (AOR) between Ms Gobbo and her handlers.
63. Although I do not have a distinct recollection, based on normal practice and procedure I expect that a registered human source would be identified by a human source number rather than name (i.e. 3838). I would have needed to access the human source's profile and other relevant material. This includes identifying human source handlers and controllers, relevant meeting times and logs.
64. The reason I believe that it was at this time that I learnt that 3838 was Ms Gobbo, was that I recall being surprised that 3838 was a woman. I remember having held an impression that 3838 was a man. I think this was because I was aware of a Drugs Squad related male 'informer' [REDACTED] I recall knowing at some stage that Detective Inspector Stephen Waddell and Senior Sergeant Ron Iddles travelled overseas to take a statement from 3838. I believe that in my mind I had put these two things together.
65. In attempts to locate the AOR in relation to Ms Gobbo I reviewed recordings of meetings between her and the SDU handlers.
66. I was not able to locate an AOR among the recordings that I listened to. There was one recording that malfunctioned. I suggested to Detective Inspector John O'Connor it may be worth exploring whether the recording could be recovered. I cannot recall what happened from there.
67. In addition to the review related to Ms Gobbo, I was tasked with reviewing [REDACTED] between [REDACTED] generally to locate AORs. I have not had an opportunity to review the report I submitted in relation to this task.
68. When I listened to the recordings of Ms Gobbo's conversations, I recall being surprised at her willingness to identify the activities of persons who were well known criminals.
69. I did not have any contact with Ms Gobbo during my time at SDU.

70. My recollection is that by 2012, SDU's focus in relation to Ms Gobbo was from a safety perspective rather than a human source perspective. We held weekly operational meetings to receive updates from the various human source teams. Even if a source was not being actively managed there might still be oversight from a safety perspective. I recall that 3838 was discussed during these meetings. In some communications Ms Gobbo was also referred to as witness F.
71. I am aware that 3838 was referred to in SDU documents titled "Handlers Workload". These documents were generated from operational meetings and included information relevant to the management of human sources and SDU members workload.
72. I have not had the benefit of reviewing my entire SDU electronic diary however I am confident that this statement records the extent of any involvement I had in relation to Ms Gobbo or 3838 whilst at SDU.

Petra Taskforce

73. My recollection is that Inspector Steve Smith provided the investigation updates at the Petra Taskforce meetings but other managers may have attended some meetings. My recollection is that Superintendent Rod Wilson or Detective Inspector Stephen Waddell attended Briars Taskforce meetings. My best recollection from attending the Committee meetings for the three taskforces is that I first heard of "3838" from Inspector Steve Smith during Petra Taskforce meetings. It is difficult given the passage of time to be sure.
74. I have been shown an email sent from Detective Senior Sergeant Gavan Ryan to Simon Overland, Graham Ashton, Luke Cornelius, Paul Hollowood and myself on 29 October 2007 related to ACC examinations. I do not recall the detail of any discussions about these examinations during Taskforce Petra Committee meetings and it does not ring any bells for me in relation to "3838" or Ms Gobbo.

Briars Taskforce

75. I do not recall any discussions related to Ms Gobbo during these meetings. I don't recall there being any discussions involving "3838" either but there may have been.

Purana Taskforce

76. My recollection is that Detective Senior Sergeant Gavan Ryan or Detective Senior Sergeant Shane O'Connell provided most of the investigation updates during these meetings.

77. I do not recall any discussions related to Ms Gobbo during these meetings. I don't recall there being any discussions involving "3838" either but there may have been.

Awareness of others (Q4)

78. I refer to my answers to questions 2 and 3 above.

Authorisation of the use of Ms Gobbo as a human source (Q5)

79. I am not aware of who authorised the use of Ms Gobbo as a human source.

Personal contact with Ms Gobbo (Q6)

80. I was aware of who Ms Gobbo was. I have never had any personal contact with Ms Gobbo however I recall seeing footage of her attending the St Kilda Road Police Complex when I was stationed there.

Information & assistance received (Q7 & Q8)

81. I refer to my answers to questions 2 and 3 above.

Concerns raised as to the use of a legal practitioner as a human source (Q9)

82. By the time I joined HSMU in 2014, I was aware that Ms Gobbo was 3838 and Witness F. I was not aware of the extent of the assistance she had provided police.

83. The source risk assessment process was redesigned during my time at HSMU. I credit Detective Inspector Stephen Waddell with driving a change of mentality with respect to this process. With the support of Detective Superintendent Paul Sheridan HSMU management created a robust risk assessment tool which included privilege professions. This tool was initially met with some resistance as it was seen to be lengthy and intrusive.

84. Ultimately, however, it led to positive cultural change where risk assessment became part of the day to day process.

85. Detective Inspector Stephen Waddell with input from human source practitioners and policy writers also rewrote Force Policy in relation to human sources and the management and categorization of human sources.

Concerns raised as to the use of Ms Gobbo as a human source (Q10)

86. I refer to my answers to questions 2 and 3 above.

Awareness about disclosure in relation to Ms Gobbo (Q11)

87. I refer to my answers to questions 2 and 3 above.

Other human sources with obligations of confidentiality or privilege (Q12)

88. I refer to my answers to questions 2 and 3 above.

Training (Q13)

89. My recollection of the relevant training or retraining I have received on these specific topics is as follows:

- (a) Obligation of disclosure – In relation to Victoria Police processes, the VPM, and Guidelines. From time to time I have sought external disclosure advice from Legal Services.
- (b) The right of accused person to silence and to a legal practitioner – Recruit training, Detective Training School and Investigation Management Course.
- (c) Legal professional privilege – Recruit training, Detective Training School and Human Source Management related training, research and advice.
- (d) Public interest immunity – Human Source Management Courses, position related training, research and by seeking advice and guidance from Legal Services.
- (e) Professional and ethical decision making –Victoria Police education/training, promotional, leadership and development programs.

90. Professional and ethical decision making is a core component of all Victoria Police training, including all of our leadership development courses.

Other information (Q14)

91. I have nothing further to add.

Dated: 11 October 2019

Officer Terrasse

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