

Statement from <sup>Green-O</sup>

1. I have previously provided a statement in response to a notice to produce given under the *Inquiries Act 2014*. This supplementary statement explains the circumstances surrounding my temporary duty upgraded as a <sup>PII</sup> [REDACTED] at the Drug Taskforce (the DTF). To assist me in making this statement, I have had access to my diaries for the period while I was at the DTF. I have also looked at some of the relevant Informer Contact Reports and the Source Management Log.
2. Due to the background information that I am aware of and the information that is well documented about the group of offenders involved in this importation I am extremely concerned about my own personal safety.
3. In [REDACTED] 2007 I applied for a promotion to the Crime Department when five <sup>PII</sup> [REDACTED] vacancies were advertised in the Police gazette. I was unsuccessful and not shortlisted for a selection panel. I sought feedback as to why this was the case. It was suggested that I should do upgrading duties at the <sup>PII</sup> [REDACTED] position, to be able to provide a more recent example of my abilities.
4. In [REDACTED] 2007, I applied for a three month secondment opportunity within the Crime Department. I was told an opportunity existed at the DTF due to leave commitments leading to short staffing issues at this rank level. In May 2007, I submitted a resume and a referee report in support of my application. This application was accepted and I was rostered to start at the DTF on the week commencing the [REDACTED] 2007 for three months until the [REDACTED] 2007. I recall that after only two or three weeks at the Drug Task Force, I was the only <sup>PII</sup> [REDACTED] in the taskforce and was supervising all six crews. Detective Inspector Steve SMITH was the Officer in Charge.
5. After this upgrading opportunity I applied for two <sup>PII</sup> [REDACTED] vacancies at the Crime Department in September, 2007. I was unsuccessful at this shortlisting stage again and was not given a selection panel opportunity. I appealed the selection of the other two selectees. I withdrew this appeal in December, 2007 primarily due to a [REDACTED] that left my partner [REDACTED]. Superintendent FRYER was supervising this selection process and he gave me the feedback that he did not think I was suitable. I applied for more vacancies during 2008 and was unsuccessful. Eventually I changed my focus to other lifestyle choices.
6. I commenced duty at the DTF on the [REDACTED] 2007. After my initial briefing by DDI Steve SMITH and D/S/SGT SNARE, I was given the primary responsibility of the two crews who were handling 'Operation AGAMAS'. The primary targets of this operation were John HIGGS and Mohammed OUEIDA. The Operation had commenced some time before my arrival at the DTF. I was also given a variety of administrative duties for the DTF as a whole. While I was at the DTF, I was often working lengthy days. Operation AGAMAS was not my only responsibility.

7. On the 13<sup>th</sup> June, 2007, Det ANDERSON from the SDU called me and told me the details of a container shipment possibly drugs. These were the container number, the ship name, Date of Departure, the port of departure and the shipping company name. He didn't tell me specifically where the information had come from but I was aware that it came from 3838 via a shipping document that was copied. I was already aware that Rob KARAM had been arranging another import at that time and assumed this was the import details from my involvement at the SDU. From my previous experience (prior to the SDU) I knew that Rob KARAM was the 'go to' for the majority of illicit drug importations on the docks. I was also aware that John HIGGS was involved in the same import. At 1215hrs I held a unit briefing with the Op AGAMAS crew and told them that I had received intelligence that HIGGS was involved in an importation that was due to arrive soon. In this meeting we discussed the impact it would have on the current direction of Operation AGAMAS and broadening the operation to include interaction with other agencies, namely the Australian Customs Service (the **ACS**), the Australian Crime Commission (the **ACC**) and the Australian Federal Police (the **AFP**).
8. On 14<sup>th</sup> June 2007, I held another unit briefing in relation to Op AGAMAS to receive updates on the status of various surveillance and resources already deployed in relation to AGAMAS targets. I also arranged to meet with representatives from the ACS and ACC.
9. On the 15<sup>th</sup> June, 2007 at 1230hrs I met with ACS liaison members [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to discuss Op AGAMAS. This would have been a brief meeting in which I would have told them in very broad terms that we believed an importation may be pending arrival. We discussed the logistics of a joint investigation between Victoria Police and the ACS. Later that day I spoke with ACS Barrier Protection Manager STEPHENS (who was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] superior) and we arranged to meet in the next few days to discuss logistics and identify issues surrounding locating and searching a drug import in a container. At this point, I would not have told the ACS anything other than that we believed a container was pending arrival. I also told them that HIGGS and KARAM were involved.
10. On the 16<sup>th</sup> June, 2007 at 1200hrs I told Det WHITE that Op AGAMAS would soon include assistance from the ACS and ACC.
11. On the 17<sup>th</sup> June, 2007, I met with Op AGAMAS investigators to receive a daily update from them in relation to the surveillance of AGAMAS targets, HIGGS and OUEIDA. I also spoke with Det FOX, who told me that KARAM had been bragging about his intimate knowledge of the freight forwarding process. This was not new information as I (and other law enforcement agencies) already knew that KARAM had intimate knowledge of the workings of customs and freight forwarding companies processes and had contacts in these areas.
12. On the 18<sup>th</sup> June, 2007 Det FOX contacted me to tell me the latest whereabouts of Op AGAMAS targets. I was regularly receiving this type of intelligence, which had minimal impact on the actual operation. This was partly due to resourcing issues, ie., it was not possible to have ongoing surveillance on those targets. I later attended at ACS house and spoke with Manager STEPHENS. I do not recall what was discussed but it would have been a general discussion about the allocation of resourcing and protocols with the AFP in relation to a customs seizure.

13. DDI Smith and I later met with representatives from the Covert Support Division. They had already been tasked with Op AGAMAS targets but were not aware that an import was pending and so we wanted to ensure they were committed to allocating resources to those targets in the near future.
14. Later in the day I met with **Investigator 1** the ACC and discussed options for mutual assistance in relation to a pending shipment and cross over with Op AGAMAS and ACC targets. Again, this was to ensure that they were committed to allocating resources to their targets. I knew they were particularly interested in Rob KARAM. I then updated the Op AGAMAS investigators regarding proposed joint investigations.
15. On the 19<sup>th</sup> June, 2007 I received the daily update from the Operation AGAMAS members. At 1150hrs I met with ACS STEPHENS and SDU Det WHITE to discuss the pending import of drugs hidden in a container. I reiterated that Rob KARAM had intimate knowledge of the workings of the freight forwarding system and computer system and that ACS would need to alter its routine, otherwise risk KARAM becoming aware that the container had come to the attention of law enforcement agencies. I recall STEPHENS was told at either this meeting or the following one on the 21<sup>st</sup> June, 2007, that the container with the drugs was in tinned tomatoes and was arriving from Italy in the next couple of weeks. I recall that STEPHENS was not told the specific container number or any other specifics.
16. On the 20<sup>th</sup> June, 2007 I had a number of meetings with other members of the DTF regarding their investigations. I also participated in the weekly management meeting with DDI Steve SMITH to update him in relation to Op AGAMAS situation and the pending importation. We discussed things like staffing issues and admin. At 1500hrs DDI SMITH and I attended at La Trobe Street Melbourne and spoke with ACC [REDACTED] and **Investigator 1** and AFP Paul OSBOURNE to discuss a Joint Agency Agreement in relation to the pending import. ACC were interested in assisting as there was a target cross over (ie., KARAM and HIGGS were involved). AFP did not want to know about a JAA or any details of the import. AFP told us that they would respond once they were advised by ACS they had found the drugs at the barrier in the container.
17. On the 21<sup>st</sup> June, 2007 at 0920hrs I met with Det WHITE and ACS STEPHENS to discuss Operation AGAMAS. I believe it was at this meeting that STEPHENS told me that ACS had profiled the cargo list of pending vessels arriving in the timeframe and identified only a few cargo containers that were suitable for their further investigation at their Container Examination Facility. I looked at this list and recognised one of the containers as the one that had been provided to me previously by ANDERSON. I advised ACS that I thought these containers were well worthy of their further investigations. I did not feel as though I needed to provide any further detail. We discussed the AFP's eventual involvement with the seizure and potential issues with this, such as whether the AFP would have sufficient resources to respond to the import at short notice. I did not provide all the details that ANDERSON had provided to me on the 13<sup>th</sup> June to ACS as I felt that the only way one would know all these details at once would be by sighting the bill of lading. This could expose a source close to the importation's organised crime group. I felt that a phrase like "tinned tomatoes arriving at the end of the month" was broad enough that it could have come to LEA from a number of ways. I also knew Customs would be able to work it out

fairly easily with these limited details using their profiling techniques. I knew this would be the case from my previous experience working at the docks and investigating organised crime groups.

18. At 1330hrs I attended a meeting with DDI Steve SMITH at the ACC offices re Op AGAMAS and briefed ACC and the ACS. ACS advised that they had identified the container by their [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. We discussed the current vessel location and that it was due in Melbourne on the 27<sup>th</sup> of June 2007.
19. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> June, 2007 Det FOX provided me with a daily update as to the whereabouts of AGAMAS targets. I later attended a meeting with ACC Investigator 1 to discuss the practicalities of running the operation (ie. proposed surveillance, technical assistance and ACC and VicPol protocols).
20. On the 25<sup>th</sup> June I attended an operational update meeting with DTF at 1410hrs discussed investigation priority. I received an update from Det FOX in relation to the movements of various AGAMAS targets.
21. On the 26<sup>th</sup> June I attended at the ACC office in relation to a further briefing with ACC, AFP and ACS representatives. We were unable to progress the JAA to include the AFP until drugs had been found in the container.
22. On the 28<sup>th</sup> June Det FOX advised me of AGAMAS target movements. At 0905hrs I met with Det WHITE and Tony STEPHENS from ACS to discuss the operation's strategy. I do not recall specifics of the conversation except that it was reiterated that the container's movements should not to be entered onto the usual ACS computer system. This was done to stop KARAM from using his intimate knowledge of the freight movement and clearing system and to increase our chances of investigating who and what criminal organisation were behind this shipment.
23. At 1620hrs Det FOX contacted me to tell me the latest whereabouts of AGAMAS targets and that the "Griffith boys" were booked into Pacific International Apartments in Lt Bourke St, Melbourne CBD. This was noteworthy intelligence as, until that point, DTF did not have direct evidence about who else was behind the importation with KARAM and HIGGS.
24. At 1700hrs I attended at the Container Examination Facility with OP AGAMAS investigators FISHER and KENNEDY along with Investigator 1 and ACS STEPHENS. I also noticed two AFP members attending. I updated DDI SMITH at 2030hrs and I advised Det FOX that millions of ecstasy pills had been located in tomato tins packed in the shipping container. I also updated Det WHITE.
25. On the 29<sup>th</sup> June Det FOX provided me with a number of updates in relation to the movements of Op AGAMAS targets. At 1415hrs I liaised with Purana Task Force and then ACS members to get an update them about the container examination. I later spoke with ACC and ACS to provide and receive updates in relation to the AFP's actions. At 2100hrs I updated Det WHITE to tell him that the container had been replaced on the dock [REDACTED]

26. On the 30<sup>th</sup> June, 2007 at 1015hrs I had a meeting involving representatives from the AFP, ACC and ACS. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss resourcing and confirm which agencies had targeted whom. The AFP's operation was now called "MOKO" and BARBARO was their target. The ACC had been targeting KARAM and AGAMAS had been targeting HIGGS. I arranged meetings with Vic Pol services to cooperate with other agencies. I also updated DDI Steve SMITH.
27. On the 1<sup>st</sup> July, 2007 we discussed coordinating various interagency resources. I received further updates from Det FOX in relation to the whereabouts of AGAMAS targets. A consideration I had at this time was that the operation 'was in full swing.' By this I mean there were sufficient resources going into monitoring the relevant targets. Too much precise intel would alert investigators in the various LEA's of a source involvement and would compromise the safety of the source, unnecessarily.
28. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> July 2007 I spent the day coordinating and discussing various interagency resources and tasking the Op AGAMAS crews. I provided updates to DDI Steve SMITH. The following days consisted of similar activity along with my administration duties at the DTF office.
29. A team managers' meeting was held on 5<sup>th</sup> July at AFP headquarters with all agencies involved and it was decided by the AFP, that the four main targets were Barbaro, Zirilli, Karam and Higgs. We planned an arrest phase of these targets. We all agreed that more evidence was required to establish a nexus between the targets and the container. On this day, the container was moved from the wharf to a holding yard nearby.
30. A further team meeting was held on 6<sup>th</sup> July, at AFP Headquarters, to review all the evidence thus far. We decided to await overt acts by the main targets. It was agreed that further investigation activity should continue by all agencies to gather evidence.
31. On the 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> July, further monitoring of the various services at the AFP Incident Room continued. The container was moved to a Licenced unpack depot in Tullamarine.
32. On the 10<sup>th</sup> July AFP members attended at the Licenced unpack depot in Tullamarine to interview employees of the unpack depot. The plan now was to [REDACTED] and wait. I don't recall that Vic Pol were involved in this part of the operation. I updated DDI Steve SMITH so that he could attend at a planned Joint Management Group meeting with AFP in relation to the future of the investigation.
33. On the 11<sup>th</sup> July I met with EPHENS from ACS and provided him with an update and vice versa. We discussed risk issues. By this, I mean we talked about operational safety and the various ways the operation could be adversely affected, including armed offenders stealing the container from the yard. I updated the Op AGAMAS crew that we were to continue with Op AGAMAS targets' investigation with ACC assistance.
34. On the 31<sup>st</sup> July, DDI Steve SMITH informed us that we would be participating in a Joint Task Force (JTF), 'INCA', with the AFP starting 0800 on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2007. [REDACTED]

35. On 1<sup>st</sup> August, 2007 I met with AFP WIGGETT in relation to the set up of the JTF. He outlined the terms and conditions of the JTF to me and that only two Victoria Police members were to be assigned.
36. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 2007 I was briefed by DDI SMITH in relation to the structure of JTF INCA. At 1330 I met with [Investigator 1] and AFP WIGGETT and we discussed JTF logistics and the differences in relation to legislation and protocols. We agreed to focus on the investigation specific to our targets.
37. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2007 I was advised by AFP that they had been running another operation, 'Operation TARRANT' with South Australia Police looking at similar targets and was a probable lead up to this import.
38. On the 6<sup>th</sup> August I attended ACC and JTF INCA room in relation to updates on services and resources. I updated DDI Steve SMITH so that he could attend the JMG meeting. At 1315hrs I attended a 'pep talk' by AFP in relation to JTF INCA and the AFP areas of control. I provided an update to Services Units in relation to coordinating resources and the investigation plan. This continued over the next few days, coordinating services to meet the investigation plan and trying to the two Victoria Police members some computer access in the AFP building.
39. On the 7<sup>th</sup> August, 2007, I had a briefing with Detective Inspector Steve SMITH regarding Inca Task Force and my role to continue as liaison and manage duties for the DTF. I managed these roles over the following weeks.
40. On the 25<sup>th</sup> August, 2007, I attended at the ACS Container Examination facility regarding the search of a container regarding Op AGAMAS other target OUEIDA. This was unrelated to the tomato tin importation.
41. On the 27<sup>th</sup> August, after a separate investigation regarding Operation AGAMAS' other target OUEIDA by the DTF with the assistance of the ACS, AFP WIGGETT advised that he had cancelled an 'all services' meeting for the JTF that day. I was later informed he had trust issues as a result of AGAMAS targeting of OUEIDA over the weekend without his involvement. This surprised me as at an early briefing with AFP they had made it perfectly clear to me who the targets of INCA were going to be and they specifically mentioned that OUEIDA was not going to be one of them. The DTF had still continued to work on OUEIDA as part of Op AGAMAS during this importation investigation.
42. On the 28<sup>th</sup> August AFP WIGGETT convened a meeting with me that resulted in making working with the AFP awkward. By the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that Victoria Police's involvement in INCA would continue. I updated ACC [REDACTED] and briefed DDI SMITH in relation to the result of the meeting. DTF OP AGAMAS crew members were still focussed on the AGAMAS targets and worked with the ACC and JTF INCA. I was still coordinating services resources for the DTF and the Inca Task Force as required.

43. I finished my duty at the DTF on the [REDACTED] 2007. I had nothing further to do with the JTF INCA. I believe that Victoria Police were not involved in the resolution phase of the JTF INCA investigation. I do not know how the DTF Op AGAMAS finished up with regard to their targets. I had no involvement with the charging of any offenders with regard to the imported tinned tomatoes with 14 million ecstasy tablets hidden in it.

Det Green [REDACTED]